We describe a general logical framework, Justification Logic, for reasoning about epistemic justification. Justification Logic is based on classical propositional logic augmented by justification assertions t:F that read t is a justification for F. Justification Logic absorbs basic principles originating from both mainstream epistemology and the mathematical theory of proofs. It contributes to the studies of the well-known Justified True Belief vs. Knowledge problem. We state a general Correspondence Theorem showing that behind each epistemic modal logic, there is a robust system of justifications. This renders a new, evidence-based foundation for epistemic logic.
Introduction
The celebrated account of Knowledge as Justified True Belief commonly attributed to Plato (cf. [29; 34] ) was widely accepted until 1963 when a paper by Edmund Gettier [29] opened the door to a broad philosophical discussion of the subject (cf. [19; 32; 45; 53; 62] and many others).
Meanwhile, commencing from seminal works [37; 67] , the notions of Knowledge and Belief have acquired formalization by means of modal logic with atoms KF (F is known) and BF (F is believed). Within this approach, the following analysis was adopted: for a given agent, F is known ∼ F holds in all epistemically possible situations.
The resulting Epistemic Logic has been remarkably successful in terms of developing a rich mathematical theory and applications (cf. [23; 48] , and other sources). However, the notion of justification, which has been an essential component of epistemic studies, was conspicuously absent in the mathematical models of knowledge within the epistemic logic framework. This deficiency is displayed most prominently, in the Logical Omniscience defect of the modal logic of knowledge (cf. [21; 22; 38; 51; 56] ). In the provability domain, the absence of an adequate description of the logic of justifications (here mathematical proofs) remained an impediment to both formalizing the BrouwerHeyting-Kolmogorov semantics of proofs and providing a long-anticipated exact provability semantics for Gödel's provability logic S4 and intuitionistic logic ([3; 4; 6; 66] ). This lack of a justification component has, perhaps, contributed to a certain gap between epistemic logic and mainstream epistemology ([34; 35] ). We would like to think that Justification Logic is a step towards filling this void. The contribution of this paper to epistemology can be briefly summarized as follows.
We describe basic logical principles for justifications and relate them to both mainstream and formal epistemology. The result is a long-anticipated mathematical notion of justification, making epistemic logic more expressive. We now have the capacity to reason about justifications, simple and compound. We can compare different pieces of evidence pertaining to the same fact. We can measure the complexity of justifications, which leads to a coherent theory of logical omniscience. Justification Logic provides a novel, evidence-based mechanism of truth-tracking which seems to be a key ingredient of the analysis of knowledge. Finally, Justification Logic furnishes a new, evidence-based foundation for the logic of knowledge, according to which F is known ∼ F has an adequate justification.
There are several natural interpretations of Justification Logic. Justification assertions of the format t:F read generically as t is a justification of F.
There is also a more strict 'justificationist' reading in which t:F is understood as t is accepted by agent as a justification of F.
The language and tools of Justification Logic accommodate both readings of t : F . Moreover, Justification Logic is general enough to incorporate other semantics that are not necessarily terminologically related to justifications or proofs. For example, t:F can be read as t is a sufficient resource for F.
Tudor Protopopescu suggests that t:F could also be assigned an externalist, non-justificationist reading, something like F satisfies conditions t.
In this setting, t would be something like a set of causes or counterfactuals. Such a reading would still maintain the distinction between partial and factive justifications, since t may not be all that is required for belief that F to count as knowledge that F.
In LP, justifications are represented by proof polynomials, which are terms built from proof variables x, y, z, . . . and proof constants a, b, c, . . . by means of two binary operations: application '·' and sum (union, choice) '+,' and one unary operation proof checker '!'. The formulas of LP are those of propositional classical logic augmented by the formation rule: if t is a proof polynomial and F a formula, then t:F is again a formula.
The Logic of Proofs LP contains the postulates of classical propositional logic and the rule of Modus Ponens along with s:(F → G) → (t:F → (s·t):G) (Application) s:F → (s+t):F , t:F → (s+t):F (Sum) t:F → !t:(t:F ) (Proof Checker ) t:F → F (Reflection).
Proof constants in LP represent 'atomic' proofs of axioms which are not analyzed any further. In addition to the usual logical properties, such as being closed under substitution and respecting the Deduction Theorem, LP enjoys the Internalization property:
If F , then there is a proof polynomial p such that p:F .
Gettier Examples
Gettier in [29] described two situations, Case I and Case II, that were supposed to provide examples of justified true beliefs which should not be considered knowledge. In this paper we will focus on formalizing Case I, which proved to be more challenging. Case II can be easily formalized in a similar fashion.
Here is a shortened exposition of Case I from [29] .
Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition:
(d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (d) entails:
(e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is true. But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Then, all of the following are true: 1) (e) is true, 2) Smith believes that (e) is true, and 3) Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true. But it is equally clear that Smith does not know that (e) is true. . ..
Gettier uses a version of the epistemic closure principle, closure of justification under logical consequence:
. . . if Smith is justified in believing P, . . . and Smith deduces Q from P . . ., then Smith is justified in believing Q.
Here is its natural formalization:
Smith is justified in believing P can be formalized as "for some t, t:P ";
Smith deduces Q from P -"there is a deduction of P → Q (available to Smith)";
Smith is justified in believing Q -"t:Q for some t."
Such a rule holds for the Logic of Proofs, as well as for all other Justification Logic systems considered in this paper. It is a combination of the Internalization Rule:
if F , then s:F for some s
and the Application Axiom:
Indeed, suppose t:P and there is a deduction of P → Q. By the Internalization Rule, s:(P → Q) for some s. From the Application Axiom, by Modus Ponens twice, we get (s·t):Q.
Goldman's Reliabilism
Goldman in [32] offered the 'fourth condition' to be added to the Justified True Belief definition of knowledge. According to [32] , a subject's belief is justified only if the truth of a belief has caused the subject to have that belief (in the appropriate way), and for a justified true belief to count as knowledge, the subject must also be able to correctly reconstruct (mentally) that causal chain.
Goldman's principle makes it clear that a justified belief (in our language, a situation t justifies F for some t) for an agent occurs only if F is true, which provides the Factivity Axiom for 'knowledge-producing' justifications t:F → F (Factivity Axiom).
The Factivity Axiom is assumed for factive justifications (systems JT, LP, JT45 below) but not for general justification systems J, J4, J45, JD45.
With a certain amount of good will, we can assume that the 'causal chain' leading from the truth of F to a justified belief that F manifests itself in the Principle of Internalization which holds for many Justification Logic systems: If F is valid, then one could construct a justification p such that p:F is valid.
Internalization is usually represented in an equivalent form (in the presence of the Completeness Theorem) as a meta-rule (7). The algorithm which builds a justified belief p : F from a strong evidence (proof) of the validity of F seems to be an instance of Goldman's 'causal chain.'
Lehrer and Paxson's Indefeasibility Condition
Lehrer and Paxson in [45] offered the following 'indefeasibility condition':
there is no further truth which, had the subject known it, would have defeated [subject's] present justification for the belief.
The 'further truth' here could refer to a possible update of the subject's database, or some possibleworlds situation, etc.: these readings lie outside the scope of our language of Boolean Justification Logic. A natural reading of 'further truth' in our setting could be 'other postulate or assumption of the system,' which means a simple consistency property which vacuously holds for all Justification Logic systems considered here. Another plausible reading of 'further truth' could be 'further evidence,' and we assume this particular reading here. Since there is no temporal or update component in our language yet, 'any further evidence' could be understood for now as 'any other justification,' or just 'any justification.' Furthermore, Lehrer and Paxson's condition seems to involve a negation of an existential quantifier over justifications 'there is no further truth . . . ,' or there is no justification. . ..
However, within the classical logic tradition, we can read this as a universal quantifier over justifications followed by a negation for any further evidence, it is not the case. . ..
Denoting 'present justification for the belief' as the assertion s:F , we reformulate Lehrer-Paxson's condition as given s:F , for any evidence t, it is not the case that t would have defeated s:F . The next step is to formalize 't does not defeat s:F .' This informal statement seems to suggest an implication if s:F holds, then the joint evidence of s and t, which we denote here as s + t, is also an evidence for F , i.e., (s + t):F holds.
Here is the resulting formal version of Lehrer-Paxson's condition: for any proposition F and any justifications s and t, the following holds
Further Assumptions
In order to build a formal account of justification, we will make some basic structural assumptions: justifications are abstract objects which have structure, operations on justifications are potentially executable, agents do not lose or forget justifications, agents apply the laws of classical logic and accept their conclusions, etc.
In the following, we consider both: justifications, which do not necessarily yield the truth of a belief, and factive justifications, which yield the truth of the belief.
Basic Principles and Systems

Application
The Application operation takes justifications s and t and produces a justification s · t such that if s:(F → G) and t:F , then (s·t):G. Symbolically,
This is a basic property of justifications assumed in combinatory logic and λ-calculi (cf. [64] ), BHK-semantics ( [65] ), Kleene realizability ( [39] ), the Logic of Proofs LP ( [4] ), etc. Application Principle (12) is related to the epistemological closure principle (cf., for example, [20; 46] ) that one knows everything that one knows to be implied by what one knows. However, (12) does not rely on this closure principle, since (12) deals with a broader spectrum of justifications, not necessarily linked to knowledge.
Note that the epistemological closure principle which could be formalized using the knowledge modality K as
smuggles the logical omniscience defect into modal epistemic logic. The latter does not have the capacity to measure how hard it is to attain knowledge [21; 22; 38; 51; 56] . Justification Logic provides natural means of escaping logical omniscience by keeping track of the size of justification terms [10] .
Monotonicity of Justification
The Monotonicity property of justification has been expressed by the operation sum '+,' which can be read from (11). If s:F , then whichever evidence t occurs, the combined evidence s + t remains a justification for F . Operation '+' takes justifications s and t and produces s + t, which is a justification for everything justified by s or by t.
s:F → (s + t):F and s:F → (t + s):F.
A similar operation '+' is present in the Logic of Proofs LP, where the sum 's+t' can be interpreted as a concatenation of proofs s and t. Correspondence Theorem 7 uses Monotonicity to connect Justification Logic with epistemic modal logic. However, it is an intriguing challenge to develop a theory of non-monotonic justifications which prompt belief revision. Some Justification Logic systems without Monotonicity have been studied in [13; 41; 42] .
Basic Justification Logic J 0
Justification terms (polynomials) are built from justification variables x, y, z, . . . and justification constants a, b, c, . . . (with indices i = 1, 2, 3 . . . which we will be omitting whenever it is safe) by means of the operations application '·' and sum '+' 1 . Constants denote atomic justifications which the system no longer analyzes; variables denote unspecified justifications.
Basic Logic of Justifications J 0 : A1. Classical propositional axioms and rule Modus Ponens,
J 0 is the logic of general (not necessarily factive) justifications for an absolutely skeptical agent for whom no formula is provably justified, i.e., J 0 does not derive t:F for any t and F . Such an agent is, however, capable of making relative justification conclusions of the form if x:A, y:B, . . . , z:C hold, then t:F .
J 0 is able, with this capacity, to adequately emulate other Justification Logic systems in its language.
Logical Awareness and Constant Specifications
The Logical Awareness principle states that logical axioms are justified ex officio: an agent accepts logical axioms (including the ones concerning justifications) as justified. As stated here, Logical Awareness is too restrictive and Justification Logic offers a flexible mechanism of Constant Specifications to represent all shades of logical awareness.
Justification Logic distinguishes between an assumption and a justified assumption. Constants are used to denote justifications of assumptions in situations when we don't analyze these justifications any further. Suppose we want to postulate that an axiom A is justified for a given agent. The way to say it in Justification Logic is to postulate e 1 :A for some evidence constant e 1 with index 1. Furthermore, if we want to postulate that this new principle e 1 :A is also justified, we can postulate e 2 :(e 1 :A) for the similar constant e 2 with index 2, etc. Keeping track of indices is not necessary, but it is easy and helps in decision procedures (cf. [44] ). The set of all assumptions of this kind for a given logic is called a Constant Specification. Here is a formal definition.
A Constant Specification CS for a given logic L is a set of formulas e n : e n−1 : . . . :
where A is an axiom of L, and e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e n are similar constants with indices 1, 2, . . . , n. We also assume that CS contains all intermediate specifications, i.e., whenever e n : e n−1 : . . . : e 1 : A is in CS, then e n−1 : . . . : e 1 : A is in CS too. In this paper, we will distinguish the following types of constant specifications:
• empty: CS = ∅. This corresponds to an absolutely skeptical agent (cf. a comment after axioms of J 0 ).
• finite: CS is a finite set of formulas. This is a representative case, since any specific derivation in Justification Logic concerns only finite sets of constants and constant specifications.
• axiomatically appropriate: for each axiom A there is a constant e 1 such that e 1 :A is in CS, and if e n : e n−1 : . . . : e 1 : A ∈ CS, then e n+1 : e n : e n−1 : . . . : e 1 : A ∈ CS.
Axiomatically appropriate CS's are necessary for ensuring the Internalization property.
• total: for each axiom A and any constants e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e n , e n : e n−1 : . . . : e 1 : A ∈ CS.
We are reserving the name TCS for the total constant specification (for a given logic). Naturally, the total constant specification is axiomatically appropriate.
Logic of Justifications with given Constant Specification
J CS = J 0 + CS.
Logic of Justifications
where R4 is the Axiom Internalization Rule:
For each axiom A and any constants e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e n , infer e n : e n−1 : . . . : e 1 : A.
Note that J 0 is J ∅ , and J coincides with J TCS . The latter reflects the idea of the unrestricted Logical Awareness for J. A similar principle appeared in the Logic of Proofs LP; it has also been anticipated in Goldman's [32] . Note that any specific derivation in J may be regarded as a derivation in J CS for a corresponding finite constant specification CS, hence finite CS's constitute an important representative class of constant specifications. Logical Awareness expressed by axiomatically appropriate constant specifications is an explicit incarnation of the Necessitation Rule in modal epistemic logic:
applied to axioms. Let us consider some basic examples of derivations in J. In Examples 1 and 2, only constants of level 1 have been used; in such situations we skip indices completely.
Example 1 This example shows how to build a justification of a conjunction from justifications of the conjuncts. In the traditional modal language, this principle is formalized as
In J we express this idea in a more precise justification language. Example 2 This example shows how to build a justification of a disjunction from justifications of either of the disjuncts. In the usual modal language this is represented by
Let us see how this would look in J. Explicit mention of Constant Specifications of Justification Logic systems is normally used when semantic issues are concerned: e.g., arithmetical, symbolic, and epistemic semantics. To define the truth value of a formula under a given interpretation, one should be given a specification of constants involved.
For each constant specification CS, J CS enjoys the Deduction Theorem, because J 0 contains propositional axioms and Modus Ponens as the only rule of inference.
Theorem 1 For each axiomatically appropriate constant specification CS, J CS enjoys Internalization:
If F , then p:F for some justification term p.
Proof. Induction on derivation length. Suppose F . If F is an axiom, then, since CS is axiomatically appropriate, there is a constant e suchb that e:F is in CS, hence an axiom of J CS . If F is in CS, then, since CS is axiomatically appropriate, e:F is in CS for some constant e. If F is obtained by Modus Ponens from X → F and X, then, by the Induction Hypothesis, s:(X → F ) and t:X for some s, t. By the Application Axiom, (s·t):F . Note that Internalization can require a growth of constant specification sets; if F with a Constant Specification CS, then the proof of p:F may need some Constant Specification CS which is different from CS. 2
Red Barn Example and Tracking Justifications
We begin illustrating new capabilities of Justification Logic with a paradigmatic Red Barn Example which Kripke developed in 1980 in objection to Nozick's account of knowledge (cf. article The Epistemic Closure Principle in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [46] , from which we borrow the formulation, with some editing for brevity).
Suppose I am driving through a neighborhood in which, unbeknownst to me, papiermâché barns are scattered, and I see that the object in front of me is a barn. Because I have barn-before-me percepts, I believe that the object in front of me is a barn. Our intuitions suggest that I fail to know barn. But now suppose that the neighborhood has no fake red barns, and I also notice that the object in front of me is red, so I know a red barn is there. This juxtaposition, being a red barn, which I know, entails there being a barn, which I do not, "is an embarrassment" 2 .
We proceed in the spirit of the Red Barn Example and consider it a general test for theories that explain knowledge. What we want is a way to represent what is going on here which maintains epistemic closure, one knows everything that one knows to be implied by what one knows,
but also preserves the problems the example was intended to illustrate. We present plausible formal analysis of the Red Barn Example in epistemic modal logic (subsections 4.1 and 4.2) and in Justification Logic (subsections 4.3 and 4.4). We will see that epistemic modal logic is capable only of telling us that there is a problem, whereas Justification Logic helps to analyse what has gone wrong. We see that closure holds as it is supposed to, and we see that if we keep track of justifications we can analyse why we had a problem.
Red Barn in modal logic of belief
In our first formalization, the logical derivation will be made in epistemic modal logic with 'my belief' modality 2. We then interpret some of the occurrences of 2 as 'knowledge' according to the problem's description. We will not try to capture the whole scenario formally; to make our point, it suffices to formalize and verify its "entailment" part. Let
• B be 'the object in front of me is a barn,'
• R be 'the object in front of me is red,'
• 2 be 'my belief' modality.
The formulation considers observations 'I see a barn' and 'I see a red barn,' and claims logical dependencies between them. The following is a natural formalization of these assumptions in the epistemic modal logic of belief:
1. 2B, 'I believe that the object in front of me is a barn'; 2. 2(B ∧R), 'I believe that the object in front of me is a red barn.'
At the metalevel, we assume that 2 is knowledge, whereas 1 is not knowledge by the problem's description. So, we could add factivity of 2, 2(B∧R) → (B∧R), to the formal description, but this would not matter for our conclusions. We note that indeed 1 logically follows from 2 in the modal logic of belief K:
, from 3, by Necessitation. As a logical truth, this is a case of knowledge too; 5. 2(B ∧R) → 2B, from 4, by modal logic.
Within this formalization, it appears that Closure Principle (15) is violated: 2(B∧R) is knowledge by the problem's description, 2[(B ∧R) → B]
is knowledge as a simple logical axiom, whereas 2B is not knowledge.
Red Barn in modal logic of knowledge
Now we will use epistemic modal logic with 'my knowledge' modality K. Here is a straightforward formalization of Red Barn Example assumptions:
1. ¬KB, 'I do not know that the object in front of me is a barn'; 2. K(B ∧R), 'I know that the object in front of me is a red barn.'
It is easy to see that these assumptions are inconsistent in the modal logic of knowledge. Indeed, 3. K(B ∧R) → (KB ∧KR), by normal modal logic; 4. KB ∧KR, from 2 and 3, by Modus Ponens; 5. KB, from 4, by propositional logic.
Lines 1 and 5 formally contradict each other.
Modal logic of knowledge does not seem to apply here.
Red Barn in Justification Logic of belief
Justification Logic seems to provide a more fine-grained analysis of the Red Barn Example. We naturally refine assumptions by introducing individual justifications u for belief that B, and v for belief that B ∧R. The set of assumptions in the Justification Logic is 1. u:B, 'u is the reason to believe that the object in front of me is a barn'; 2. v:(B ∧R), 'v is the reason to believe that the object in front of me is a red barn.' On the metalevel, the description states that this is a case of knowledge, not merely a belief.
Again, we can add the factivity condition for 2, v:(B ∧R) → (B ∧R), but this does not change the analysis here. Let us try to reconstruct the reasoning of the agent in J:
3 Closure holds! Instead of deriving 1 from 2 as in Section 4.1, we have obtained a correct conclusion that (a · v):B, i.e., 'I know B for reason a · v,' which seems to be different from u: the latter is the result of a perceptual observation, whereas the former is the result of logical reasoning. In particular, we cannot conclude that 2, v:(B ∧R), entails 1, u:B; moreover, with some basic model theory of J in Section 5, we can show that 2 does not entail 1. Hence, after observing a red façade, I indeed know B, but this knowledge does not come from 1, which remains a case of belief rather than of knowledge.
Red Barn in Justification Logic of knowledge
Within this formalization, t:F is interpreted as
As in Section 4.2, we assume 1. ¬u:B, 'u is not a sufficient reason to know that the object is a barn'; 2. v:(B ∧R), 'v is a sufficient reason to know that the object is a red barn.' This is a perfectly consistent set of assumptions in the logic of factive justifications The formal analyses provided in 4.3 and 4.4 is similar in spirit to a "conclusive reason" style of analysis ( [19] ) which is formulated in terms of evidence tracking rather than belief tracking.
Basic Epistemic Semantics
The standard epistemic semantics for J has been provided by the proper adaptation of KripkeFitting models [25] and Mkrtychev models [50] .
A Kripke-Fitting J-model M = (W, R, E, ) is a Kripke model (W, R, ) enriched with an admissible evidence function E such that E(t, F ) ⊆ W for any justification t and formula F . Informally, E(t, F ) specifies the set of possible worlds where t is considered admissible evidence for F . The intended use of E is in the truth definition for justification assertions: 2. t is an admissible evidence for F at u, i.e., u ∈ E(t, F ).
An admissible evidence function E must satisfy the closure conditions with respect to operations '·' and '+':
. This condition states that whenever s is an admissible evidence for F → G and t is an admissible evidence for F , their 'product,' s·t, is an admissible evidence for G.
• Sum:
. This condition guarantees that s + t is an admissible evidence for F whenever either s is admissible for F or t is admissible for F .
These are natural conditions to place on E because they are necessary for making basic axioms of Application and Monotonicity valid. We say that E(t, F ) holds at a given world u if u ∈ E(t, F ). Given a model M = (W, R, E, ), the forcing relation is extended from sentence variables to all formulas as follows: for each u ∈ W , 1. respects Boolean connectives at each world (u F ∧ G iff u F and u G; u ¬F iff u F , etc.); 2. u t:F iff u ∈ E(t, F ) and v F for every v ∈ W with uRv.
Note that an admissible evidence function E may be regarded as a Fagin-Halpern awareness function [23] equipped with the structure of justifications.
Theorem 2 For any Constant Specification CS, J CS is sound and complete for the class of all Kripke-Fitting models respecting CS.
Proof.
1. Fix a Constant Specification CS and consider J CS . Soundness is straightforward. Induction on derivations in J CS . Let us check the axioms. Application. Suppose u s:(F → G) and u t:F . Then, by the definition of forcing, u ∈ E(s, F → G) and u ∈ E(t, F ), hence, by the closure condition for E, u ∈ E(s·t, G). Moreover, for each v such that uRv, v F → G and v F , hence v G. Thus u (s·t):G and u s:(F → G) → (t:F → (s·t):G).
Sum. Suppose u t:F . Then u ∈ E(t, F ), hence, by the closure condition for E, u ∈ E(s+t, F ). In addition, v F for each v such that uRv, hence u (s+t):F . Thus u t:F → (s+t):F .
Axioms from CS hold at each world, since the models respect CS. The Induction
Step corresponds to the use of Modus Ponens, which is clearly a sound rule here.
To establish completeness, we use standard canonical model construction. The canonical model M = (W, R, E, ) for J CS is defined as follows:
• W is the set of all maximal consistent sets in J CS . Following an established tradition, we denote elements of W as Γ, ∆, etc.;
• ΓR∆ iff Γ ⊆ ∆, where Γ = {F | t:F ∈ Γ for some t};
The Truth Lemma claims that for all F 's,
This is established by standard induction on the complexity of F . The atomic cases are covered by the definition of ' .' The Boolean induction steps are standard. Consider the case when F is t:G for some t and G. If t:G ∈ Γ, then G ∈ ∆ for all ∆ such that ΓR∆ by the definition of R. By the Induction Hypothesis, ∆ G. In addition, Γ ∈ E(t, G) by the definition of E. Hence Γ t:G, i.e., Γ F .
If t:G ∈ Γ, then Γ ∈ E(t, G), i.e., Γ t:G and Γ F . Furthermore, M respects CS at each node. Indeed, by the construction of M, CS ⊆ Γ for each Γ ∈ W . By the Truth Lemma, Γ c:A for each c:A ∈ CS.
The conclusion of the proof of Theorem 2 is standard. Let F be not derivable in J CS . Then the set {¬F } is consistent. Using the standard saturation construction ( [23; 48] ), extend {¬F } to a maximal consistent set Γ. By consistency, F ∈ Γ. By the Truth Lemma, Γ F . 2
There are several features of the canonical model which could be included into the formulation of the Completeness Theorem to make it stronger.
Strong Evidence. We can show that the canonical model considered in this proof satisfies the Strong Evidence property Γ ∈ E(t, F ) implies Γ t:F.
Indeed, let Γ ∈ E(t, F ). By the definition of E, t:F ∈ Γ, hence F ∈ Γ and F ∈ ∆ for each ∆ such that ΓR∆. By the Truth Lemma, ∆ F , hence Γ t:F . In a model with the Strong Evidence property there are no void or irrelevant justifications; if t is an admissible evidence for F , then t is a 'real evidence' for F , i.e., F holds at all possible worlds. Fully Explanatory property for axiomatically appropriate Constant Specifications:
If ∆ F for all ∆ such that ΓR∆, then Γ t:F for some t.
Note that for axiomatically appropriate constant specifications CS, the Internalization property holds: if G is provable in J CS , then t:G is also provable there for some term t. Here is the proof of the Fully Explanatory property for canonical models 3 . Suppose Γ t:F for any justification term t. Then the set Γ ∪ {¬F } is consistent. Indeed, otherwise for some t 1 :X 1 , t 2 :X 2 , . . . , t n :X n ∈ Γ,
Therefore, Γ t:F -a contradiction. Let ∆ be a maximal consistent set extending Γ ∪ {¬F }. By the definition of R, ΓR∆, by the Truth Lemma, ∆ F , which contradicts the assumptions. Mkrtychev semantics is a predecessor of Kripke-Fitting semantics ( [50] ). Mrktychev models are Kripke-Fitting models with a single world, and the proof of Theorem 2 can be easily modified to establish completeness of J CS with respect to Mkrtychev models.
Theorem 3 For any Constant Specification CS, J CS is sound and complete for the class of Mrktychev models respecting CS.
Proof. Soundness follows immediately from Theorem 2. For completeness, define the canonical model as in Theorem 2 except for R, which should be taken empty. This assumption makes the condition '∆ F for all ∆ such that ΓR∆' vacuously true, and the forcing condition for justification assertions Γ t:F becomes equivalent to Γ ∈ E(t, F ), i.e., t:F ∈ Γ. This simplification immediately verifies the Truth Lemma.
The conclusion of the proof of Theorem 3 is standard. Let F be not derivable in J CS . Then the set {¬F } is consistent. Using the standard saturation construction, extend it to a maximal consistent set Γ containing ¬F . By consistency, F ∈ Γ. By the Truth Lemma, Γ F . The Mkrtychev model consisting of this particular Γ is the desired counter-model for F . The rest of the canonical model is irrelevant.
2
Note that Mkrtychev models built in Theorem 3 are not reflexive, and possess the Strong Evidence property. On the other hand, Mkrtychev models cannot be Fully Explanatory, since '∆ F for all ∆ such that ΓR∆' is vacuously true, but Γ t:F is not.
Theorem 3 shows that the information about Kripke structure in Kripke-Fitting models can be completely encoded by the admissible evidence function. Mkrtychev models play an important theoretical role in Justification Logic [7; 16; 40; 43; 49] . On the other hand, as we will see in Section 10, Kripke-Fitting models can be useful as counter-models with desired properties since they take into account both epistemic Kripke structure and evidence structure. Speaking metaphorically, Kripke-Fitting models naturally reflect two reasons why a certain fact F can be unknown to an agent: F fails at some possible world or an agent does not have a sufficient evidence of F .
Another application area of Kripke-Fitting style models is Justification Logic with both epistemic modalities and justification assertions (cf. [5; 12] ). 
Factivity
Unlike Application and Monotonicity, Factivity of justifications is not required in basic Justification Logic systems, which makes the latter capable of representing both partial and factive justifications. Factivity states that justifications of F are factive, i.e., sufficient for an agent to conclude that F is true. This yields the Factivity Axiom
which has a similar motivation to the Truth Axiom in epistemic modal logic
widely accepted as a basic property of knowledge (Plato, Wittgenstein, Hintikka, etc.). The Factivity Axiom (16) first appeared in the Logic of Proofs LP as a principal feature of mathematical proofs. Indeed, in this setting (16) is valid: if there is a mathematical proof t of F , then F must be true.
We adopt the Factivity Axiom (16) for justifications that lead to knowledge. However, factivity alone does not warrant knowledge, which has been demonstrated by Gettier examples ( [29] ). JT-models are J-models with reflexive accessibility relations R. The reflexivity condition makes each possible world accessible from itself which exactly corresponds to the Factivity Axiom. The direct analogue of Theorem 1 hold for JT CS as well.
Logic of Factive Justifications:
Theorem 4 For any Constant Specification CS, each of the logics JT CS is sound and complete with respect to the class of JT-models respecting CS.
Proof. We now proceed as in the proof of Theorem 2. The only addition to soundness is establishing that the Factivity Axiom holds in reflexive models. Let R be reflexive. Suppose u t:F . Then v F for all v such that uRv. By reflexivity of R, uRu, hence u F as well.
For completeness, it suffices to check that R in the canonical model is reflexive. Indeed, if s:F ∈ Γ, then, by the properties of the maximal consistent sets, F ∈ Γ as well, since JT derives s:F → F (with any CS). Hence Γ ⊆ Γ and ΓRΓ.
Mkrtychev JT-models are singleton JT-models, i.e., JT-models with singleton W 's.
Theorem 5 For any Constant Specification CS, each of the logics JT CS is sound and complete with respect to the class of Mkrtychev JT-models respecting CS.
Proof. Soundness follows from Theorem 4. For completeness, we follow the footprints of Theorem 2, Theorem 3, but define the accessibility relation R as ΓR∆ iff Γ = ∆. 
Russell's Example: Induced Factivity
Here is Russell's well-known example from [60] of an epistemic scenario which can be meaningfully analyzed in Justification Logic. 
In the original setting (18), we do not claim that w is a factive justification for B; moreover, such factivity is not completely consistent with our intuition. Paradoxically, however, in the basic Justification Logic J, we can logically deduce factivity of w from (18) However, this derivation utilizes the fact that r is a factive justification for B to conclude w:B → B, which constitutes the case of 'induced factivity' of w:B. The question is, how can we distinguish the 'real' factivity of r:B from an 'induced factivity' of w:B? Again, some sort of truth-tracking is needed here, and Justification Logic seems to do the job. The natural approach would be to consider the set of assumptions (18) without r:B, i.e., {w:B, r:B → B},
and establish that factivity of w, i.e., w : B → B is not derivable from (19) . Here is a J-model M = (W, R, E, ) in which (19) holds but w:B → B does not. W = {0}, R = ∅, 0 B, and E(t, F ) holds for all pairs (t, F ) except (r, B). It is easy to see that the closure conditions Application and Sum on E are fulfilled. At 0, w:B holds, i.e., On the other hand, 0 w:B → B since B does not hold at 0.
Additional Principles and Systems
In this section, we discuss other principles and operations which may or may not be added to the core Justification Logic systems.
Positive Introspection
One of the common principles of knowledge is identifying knowing and knowing that one knows. In the formal modal setting, this corresponds to
This principle has an adequate explicit counterpart: the fact that the agent accepts t as a sufficient evidence of F serves as a sufficient evidence that t:F . Often, such meta-evidence has a physical form, e.g., a referee report certifying that a proof of a paper is correct, a computer verification output given a formal proof t of F as an input, a formal proof that t is a proof of F , etc. Positive Introspection assumes that given t, the agent produces a justification !t of t:F such that We also define J4 0 , J4 CS , LP 0 , and LP CS in the natural way (cf. Section 3.4). The direct analogue of Theorem 1 holds for J4 CS and LP CS as well. Note that in the presence of the Positive Introspection Axiom, one could limit the scope of the Axiom Internalization Rule R4 to internalizing axioms which are not yet of the form e : A. This is how it has been done in LP: the Axiom Internalization can then be emulated by using !!e:(!e:(e:A)) instead of e 3 :(e 2 :(e 1 :A)), etc. The notion of Constant Specification could also be simplified accordingly.
Such modifications are minor and they do not affect the main theorems and applications of Justification Logic.
Negative Introspection
Pacuit and Rubtsova considered in [54; 55; 57; 58] the Negative Introspection operation '?' which verifies that a given justification assertion is false. A possible motivation for considering such an operation could be that the positive introspection operation '!' may well be regarded as capable of providing conclusive verification judgments about the validity of justification assertions t:F . So, when t is not a justification for F , such a '!' should conclude that ¬t:F . This is normally the case for computer proof verifiers, proof checkers in formal theories, etc. This motivation is, however, nuanced: the examples of proof verifiers and proof checkers work with both t and F as inputs, whereas the Pacuit-Rubtsova format ?t suggests that the only input for '?' is a justification t, and the result ?t is supposed to justify propositions ¬t:F uniformly for all F 's for which t:F does not hold. Such an operation '?' does not exist for formal mathematical proofs since ?t should be a single proof of infinitely many propositions ¬t:F , which is impossible 6 . For what it's worth, we include Negative Introspection in the list of additional justification principles, and leave the decision of whether to accept it or not to the user.
A6. Negative Introspection Axiom ¬t:F → ?t:(¬t:F ).
We define systems J45= J4 + A6, JD45= J45 + ¬t:⊥,
and naturally extend these definitions to J45 CS , JD45 CS , and JT45 CS . The direct analogue of Theorem 1 holds for J45 CS , JD45 CS , and JT45 CS .
More Epistemic Models
We now define epistemic models for other Justification Logic systems.
• J4-models are J-models with transitive R and two additional conditions:
Monotonicity with respect to R, i.e., u ∈ E(t, F ) and uRv yield v ∈ E(t, F ),
Introspection closure: E(t, F ) ⊆ E(!t, t:F );
• LP-models are J4-models with reflexive R (these are the original Kripke-Fitting models);
• J45-models are J4-models satisfying conditions:
Negative Introspection closure: [E(t, F )] c ⊆ E(?t, ¬t:F ) (Here [X] c denotes the complement of X.)
Strong Evidence: u t:F for all u ∈ E(t, F ) (i.e., only 'actual' evidence is admissible).
Note that J45-models satisfy the Stability property: uRv yields 'u ∈ E(t, F ) iff v ∈ E(t, F ).' In other words, E is monotone with respect to R −1 as well. Indeed, the direction 'u ∈ E(t, F ) yields v ∈ E(t, F )' is due to Monotonicity. Suppose u ∈ E(t, F ). By Negative Introspection closure, u ∈ E(?t, ¬t:F ). By Strong Evidence, u ?t:(¬t:F ). By the definition of forcing, v ¬t:F , i.e., v t:F . By Strong Evidence, v ∈ E(t, F ).
Note also that the Euclidean property of the accessibility relation R is not required for J45-models and is not needed to establish the soundness of J45 with respect to J45-models. However, the canonical model for J45 is Euclidean, hence both soundness and completeness claims trivially survive an additional requirement that R is Euclidean.
• JD45-models are J45-models with the Serial condition on the accessibility relation R: for each u there is v such that uRv holds.
• JT45-models are J45-models with reflexive R. Again, the Euclidean property (or, equivalently, symmetry) of R is not needed for soundness. However, these properties hold for the canonical JT45-model, hence they could be included into the formulation of the Completeness Theorem.
Theorem 6 Each of the logics J4 CS , LP CS , J45 CS , JT45 CS for any Constant Specification is sound and complete with respect to the corresponding class of epistemic models. JD45 CS is complete w.r.t. its epistemic models for axiomatically appropriate CS.
Proof. We will follow the footprints of the proof of Theorem 2. 1. J4. For soundness, it now suffices to check the validity of the Positive Introspection Axiom at each node of any J4-model. Suppose u t:F . Then u ∈ E(t, F ) and v F for each v such that uRv. By the closure condition, u ∈ E(!t, t:F ), and it remains to check that v t:F . By monotonicity of E, v ∈ E(t, F ). Now, take any w such that vRw. By transitivity of R, uRw as well, hence w F . Thus v t:F , u !t:t:F , and u t:F → !t:t:F .
Completeness is again established as in Theorem 2. It only remains to check that the accessibility relation R is transitive, the admissible evidence function E is monotone, and the additional closure condition on E holds.
Monotonicity. Suppose ΓR∆ and Γ ∈ E(t, F ), i.e., t:F ∈ Γ. By maximality of Γ, !t:t:F ∈ Γ as well, since J4 t:F → !t:t:F . By definition, t:F ∈ ∆, i.e., ∆ ∈ E(t, F ).
Transitivity. Suppose ΓR∆, ∆RΣ, and t:F ∈ Γ. Then, by monotonicity, t:F ∈ ∆. By the definition of R, F ∈ Σ, hence ΓRΣ.
Closure. Suppose Γ ∈ E(t, F ), i.e., t:F ∈ Γ. Then as above, !t:t:F ∈ Γ, hence Γ ∈ E(!t, t:F ).
2.
LP. This is the well-studied case of the Logic of Proofs, cf. [25] .
3. J45. Soundness. We have to check the Negative Introspection Axiom. Let u ¬t : F , i.e., u t:F . By the Strong Evidence condition, u ∈ E(t, F ). By Negative Introspection closure, u ∈ E(?t, ¬t:F ). By Strong Evidence, u ?t:(¬t:F ).
Completeness. We follow the same canonical model construction as in J and J4. The only addition is checking Negative Introspection closure. Let Γ ∈ E(t, F ). Then t : F ∈ Γ. By maximality, ¬t:F ∈ Γ. By the Negative Introspection Axiom, ?t:(¬t:F ) ∈ Γ, hence Γ ∈ E(?t, ¬t:F ).
Here is an additional feature of the canonical model that can be included in the formulation of the Completeness Theorem to make it more specific.
R is Euclidean. Let ΓR∆ and ΓR∆ . It suffices to show that ∆ ⊆ ∆ . Let F ∈ ∆ . Then for some t, t:F ∈ ∆, i.e., ∆ ∈ E(t, F ). By Stability, Γ ∈ E(t, F ), hence t:F ∈ Γ and F ∈ Γ . By the definition of R, F ∈ ∆ .
4. JD45. The proof can be found in [44] .
5. JT45. For soundness, it suffices to check the Factivity Axiom, which easily follows from the reflexivity of R. For completeness, follow the footprints of 3 and note that R is reflexive. Indeed, Γ ⊆ Γ for reflexive theories.
The additional features of the canonical model are as follows: R is an equivalence relation, the admissible evidence function does not distinguish equivalent worlds. This follows easily from 5. 2
Historical survey. The first Justification Logic system LP was introduced in 1995 in [2] (cf. also [4] ). Such basic properties of Justification Logic as internalization, realization, arithmetical semantics [2; 4] , symbolic models and complexity estimates ([16; 43; 49; 50] ), and epistemic semantics and completeness [24; 25] were first established for LP.
A fair amount of work has already been done on Jusification Logics other than LP. Systems J, J4, and JT were first considered in [15] under different names and in a slightly different setting 7 . JT45 appeared independently in [54; 55] and [57; 58] , and JD45 in [54; 55] . J45 has, perhaps, first been considered in this work. Systems combining epistemic modalities and justifications were studied in [5; 11; 12] .
Mkrtychev semantics for J, JT, and J4 with Completeness Theorem were found in [43] . Complexity bounds for LP and J4 were found in [43; 49] . A comprehensive overview of all decidability and complexity results can be found in [44] .
Forgetful Projection and the Correspondence Theorem
An intuitive connection between justification assertions and the justified belief modality 2 involves the informal existential quantifier: 2F is read as for some x, x:F .
The language of Justification Logic does not have quantifiers over justifications, but instead has a sufficiently rich system of operations (polynomials) on justifications. We can use Skolem's idea of replacing quantifiers by functions and view Justification Logic systems as Skolemized logics of knowledge/belief. Naturally, to convert a Justification Logic sentence to the corresponding Epistemic Modal Logic sentence, one can use the forgetful projection ';' that replaces each occurrence of t:F by 2F .
Example: the sentence x:P → f (x):Q can be regarded as a Skolem-style version of ∃x(x:P ) → ∃y(y:Q), which can be read as 2P → 2Q, which is the forgetful projection of the original sentence x:P → f (x):Q (here, P , Q are assumed to be atomic sentences for simplicity's sake). Examples (P , Q are atomic propositions):
t:P → P ; 2P → P, t:P → !t:(t:P ) ; 2P → 22P,
Forgetful projection sometimes forgets too much, e.g., a logical triviality x:P → x:P , a meaningful principle x:P → (x+y):P , and a non-valid formula x:P → y:P have the same forgetful projection 2P → 2P . However, ';' always maps valid formulas of Justification Logic to valid formulas of Epistemic Logic. The converse also holds: any valid formula of Epistemic Logic is a forgetful projection of some valid formula of Justification Logic. This follows from Correspondence Theorem 7. We assume that ';' is naturally extended from sentences to logics.
4. LP ; S4
J45 ; K45
6. JD45 ; KD45
JT45 ; S5
Proof. It is straightforward that the forgetful projection of each of the Justification Logic systems J, JT, J4, LP, J45, JD45, JT45 is derivable in the corresponding epistemic modal logics K, T, K4, S4, K45, KD45, S5, respectively. The core of Theorem 7 is the Realization Theorem:
One can recover justification terms for all modal operators in valid principles of epistemic modal logics K, T, K4, S4, K45, KD45, and S5 such that the resulting formula is derivable in the corresponding Justification Logic system J, JT, J4, LP, J45, JD45, and JT45.
The important feature of the Realization Theorem is that it recovers realizing functions according to the existential reading of the modality, i.e., negative occurrences of the modality are realized by (distinct) free variables, and the positive occurrences by justification polynomials, depending on these variables. For example, 2F → 2G will be realized by x:F → f (x):G where F , G are realizations of F and G, respectively.
The Realization Theorem was first established for S4/LP (case 4) in [2; 4] , cases 1-3 are covered in [15] . The Realization Theorem for 7 is established in [58] using a very potent method from [25] , and the proof for 5 and 6 is very similar to [25; 58] and can be safely omitted here.
The Correspondence Theorem shows that the major epistemic modal logics K, K4, K45, KD45 (for belief) and T, S4, S5 (for knowledge) have exact Justification Logic counterparts J, J4, J45, JD45 (for partial justifications) and JT, LP, JT45 (for factive justifications).
Foundational Consequences of the Correspondence Theorem
Is there anything new that we have learned from the Correspondence Theorem about epistemic modal logics?
First of all, this theorem provides a new semantics for major modal logics. In addition to the traditional Kripke-style 'universal' reading of 2F as F holds in all possible situations, there is now a rigorous 'existential' semantics for 2F that reads as there is a witness (proof, justification) for F.
Perhaps the justification semantics plays a similar role in modal logic to that played by Kleene realizability in intuitionistic logic. In both cases, the intended semantics was existential: the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation of intuitionistic logic ([36; 65; 66] ) and Gödel's provability reading of S4 ( [30; 31] ). In both cases, a later possible-world semantics of universal character became a highly potent and dominant technical tool. However, in both cases, Kripke semantics did not solve the original semantical problems. It took Kleene realizability [39; 63] to reveal the computational semantics of intuitionistic logic and the Logic of Proofs [2; 4] to provide exact BHK semantics of proofs for intuitionistic and modal logic.
In the epistemic context, Justification Logic and the Correspondence Theorem add a new 'justification' component to modal logics of knowledge and belief. Again, this new component was in fact an old and central notion which has been widely discussed by mainstream epistemologists but has remained out of the scope of formal logical methods. The Correspondence Theorem tells us that justifications are compatible with Hintikka-style systems and hence can be regarded as a foundation for epistemic modal logic.
Another comparison suggests itself here: Skolem functions for first-order logic which provide a functional reading of quantifiers. It might seem that Skolem functions do not add much, since they do not suggest altering first-order logic. However, Skolem functions proved to be very useful for foundations (e.g., Henkin and Herbrand models, etc.), as well as for applications (Resolution, Logic Programming, etc.).
Note that the Realization Theorem is not at all trivial. For cases 1-4, realization algorithms are known that use cut-free derivations in the corresponding modal logics [2; 4; 15; 16] . For 5-7, the Realization Theorem has been established by Fitting's method or its proper modifications [25; 58] . In principle, these results also produce realization procedures which are based on exhaustive search.
It would be a mistake to draw the conclusion that any modal logic has a reasonable Justification Logic counterpart. For example, the logic of formal provability GL ( [8; 14] ) contains the Löb Principle
which does not seem to have an epistemically acceptable explicit version. Let us consider, for example, a case when F is the propositional constant ⊥ for false. A Skolem-style reading of (20) suggests that there are justification terms s and t such that
This is intuitively false for factive justification, though. Indeed, s:⊥ → ⊥ is the Factivity Axiom. Apply Axiom Internalization R4 to obtain c:[s:⊥ → ⊥] for some constant c. This choice of c makes the antecedent of (21) intuitively true and the conclusion of (21) false 8 . In particular, (20) is not valid for proof interpretation (cf. [33] for a total account of which principles of GL are realizable).
Quantifier-Free First-Order Justification Logic
In this section, we extend J from the propositional language to the quantifier-free first-order language. To simplify formalities, we will regard here the first-order language without functional symbols, but with equality. Later, in Section 10, we will introduce definite descriptions in the form ιxF (x). The language under consideration in this section is the first-order predicate language with individual variables and constants, predicate symbols of any arity and the equality symbol '=,' along with justification terms (including operations '·' and '+') and the formula formation symbol ':' as in Section 3.3. Formulas are defined in the usual first-order way (without quantifiers) with an additional clause that if F is a formula and t is a justification polynomial, then t:F is again a formula. The 'quantifier-free J' has all the axioms and rules of J, plus the equality axioms.
The formal system qfJ 0 has the following postulates:
A1. Classical axioms of quantifier-free first-order logic with equality and Modus Ponens,
. g = g for any individual term g (reflexivity of equality);
) (substitutivity of equality), where f and g are individual terms, P is any atomic formula, P [f /x] and P [g/x] are the results of replacing all the occurrences of a variable x in P by f and g respectively; we will use notations P (f ), P (g) for that.
The system qfJ is qfJ 0 + R4, where
R4.
As in Section 3.4, we define Constant Specifications and systems qfJ CS . In particular, qfJ ∅ is qfJ 0 and qfJ TCS is qfJ.
The following proposition follows easily from the definitions.
Proposition 1 Deduction Theorem holds for qfJ CS for any constant specification CS. Internalization holds for qfJ CS for an axiomatically appropriate constant specification CS.
The following theorem provides a way to resolve the Frege puzzle ( [28] ) in an epistemic environment: equality of individual objects alone does not warrant substitutivity, but justified equality does.
Theorem 8 [Justified substitution]
For any individual terms f and g, justification variable u, and atomic formula P (x), there is a justification term s(u) such that qfJ proves
The same holds for any qfJ CS with an axiomatically appropriate constant specification CS.
Proof. Taking into account Example 1, it suffices to establish that for some t(u),
From E2 it follows that qfJ proves
By R4, there is a justification constant c such that qfJ proves
By A2, qfJ proves
By Modus Ponens, qfJ proves
It suffices now to pick c·u as t(u). 2
An unjustified substitution can fail in qfJ. Namely, for any individual variables x and y, a predicate symbol P , and justification term s, the formula
is not valid. To establish this, one needs some model theory for qfJ.
We define qfJ-models as the usual first-order Kripke models 9 equipped with admissible evidence functions. A model is (W, {D w }, R, E, ) such that the following properties hold.
• W is an nonempty set of worlds.
• {D w } is the collection of nonempty domains D w for each w ∈ W .
• R is the binary (accessibility) relation on W .
• E is the admissible evidence function which for each justification term t and formula F , returns the set of worlds E(t, F ) ⊆ W . Informally, these are the worlds where t is admissible evidence for F . We also assume that E satisfies the usual closure properties Application and Sum (Section 5).
• is the forcing (truth) relation such that assigns elements of D w to individual variables and constants for each w ∈ W , for each n-ary predicate symbol P , and any a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ∈ D w , it is specified whether P (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) holds in D w , is extended to all the formulas by stipulating that w s = t iff ' ' maps s and t to the same element of D w , w P (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n ) iff ' ' maps t i 's to a i 's and P (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) holds in D w , w F ∧ G iff w F and w G, w ¬F iff w F , w t:F iff v F for all v such that wRv, and w ∈ E(t, F ).
The notion of a model respecting given constant specification is directly transfered from Section 5.
The following Theorem is established in the same manner as the soundness part of Theorem 2.
Theorem 9 For any Constant Specification CS, qfJ CS is sound with respect to the corresponding class of epistemic models.
We are now ready to show that instances of unjustified substitution can fail in qfJ. To do this, it now suffices to build a qfJ-counter-model for (22) with the total constant specification. Obviously, the maximal E (i.e., E(t, F ) contains each world for any t and F ) respects any constant specification.
The Kripke-Fitting counter-model in Figure 1 exploits the traditional modal approach to refute a belief assertion by presenting a possible world where the object of this belief does not hold. In the picture, only true atomic formulas are shown next to possible worlds.
• W = {0, 1}; R = {(0, 1)}; D 0 = D 1 = {a, b};
• 1 P (a) and 1 P (b); the truth value of P at 0 does not matter;
• x and y are interpreted as a at 0; x is interpreted as a and y as b at 1;
• E is maximal at 0 and 1.
Obviously, 0 x = y. Since 1 P (x) ↔ P (y), for any justification term s, 0 s: Figure 1 : Fitting counter-model for unjustified substitution
Formalization of Gettier Examples
We consider Gettier's Case I in detail; Case II is much simpler logically and can be given similar treatment. We will present a complete formalization of Case I in qfJ with a definite description operation. Let
• J(x) be the predicate x gets the job;
• C(x) be the predicate x has (ten) coins (in his pocket);
• Jones and Smith be individual constants denoting Jones and Smith, respectively 10 ;
• u be a justification variable.
Natural Model for Case I
Gettier's assumptions (d) and (e) contain a definite description the man who will get the job.
In this section, we will formalize Case I using a definite description ι-operation such that ιxP (x) is intended to denote the x such that P (x).
We interpret ιxP (x) in a given world of a qfJ-model as the element a such that P (a) if there exists a unique a satisfying P (a). Otherwise, ιxP (x) is undefined and any atomic formula where ιxP (x) actually occurs is taken to be false. Definite description terms are non-rigid designators: ιxP (x) may be given different interpretations in different worlds of the same qfJ-model (cf. [26] ). The use of a definite description Jones is the man who will get the job as a justified belief by Smith hints that Smith has strong evidence for the fact that at most one person will get the job. This is implicit in Gettier's assumption. We now present a Fitting model M which may be regarded as an exact epistemic formulation of Case I.
1. At the actual world 0, J(Smith), C(Smith), and C(Jones) 11 hold and J(Jones) does not hold.
2. There is a possible belief world 1 for Smith at which J(Jones) and ¬J(Smith) hold. These conditions follow from proposition (d)
Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has coins or, in logic form, (Jones = ιxJ(x)) ∧ C(Jones)
for which Smith has a strong evidence. In addition, Smith has no knowledge of 'Smith has coins' and there should be a possible world at which C(Smith) is false; we use 1 to represent this possibility.
3. World 1 is accessible from 0.
4. Smith has a strong evidence of (d), which we will represent by introducing a justification variable u such that u:
holds at the actual world 0. We further assume that the admissible evidence function E respects the justification assertion (24), which yields 0 ∈ E(u, (Jones = ιxJ(x)) ∧ C(Jones)).
To keep things simple, we can assume that E is the maximal admissible evidence function, i.e., E(t, F ) = {0, 1} for each t, F .
These observations lead to the following model M on Figure 2 .
• 11 Strictly speaking, Case I explicitly states only that Smith has a strong evidence that C(Jones), which is not sufficient to conclude that C(Jones), since Smith's justifications are not necessarily factive. However, since the actual truth value of C(Jones) does not matter in Case I, we assume that in this instance, Smith's belief that C(Jones) was true.
• W = {0, 1}; R = {(0, 1)};
• D 0,1 = {Jones, Smith}, Jones is interpreted as 'Jones' and Smith as 'Smith';
• 0 J(Smith), C(Jones), C(Smith), ¬J(Jones);
• 1 J(Jones), C(Jones), ¬J(Smith), ¬C(Smith);
• ιxJ(x) at 0 is interpreted as Smith and at 1 as Jones;
• E is maximal at both 0 and 1.
It is interesting to compare this model with the axiomatic description of Case I. Here is the list of explicit assumptions:
It follows from the Soundness Theorem 9 that assumptions (25) provide a sound description of the actual world:
Example 3
The description of a model by (25) is not complete. For example, conditions (25) do not specifically indicate whether t:C(Smith) holds at the actual world for some t, whereas it is clear from the model that 0 t:C(Smith) for any t since 1 C(Smith) and 1 is accessible from 0. Model M extends the set of assumptions (25) to a possible complete specification: every ground proposition F in the language of this example is either true or false at the 'actual' world 0 of the model.
Formalizing Gettier's Reasoning
Gettier's conclusion in Case I states that Smith is justified in believing that 'The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.' In our formal language, this amounts to a statement that for some justification term t, t:
is derivable in qfJ from assumptions of Case I.
Theorem 10 Gettier's conclusion t:C(ιxJ(x)) is derivable in qfJ from assumptions (25) of Case I. Furthermore, t:C(ιxJ(x)) holds at the 'actual world' 0 of the natural model M of Case I.
Proof. In order to find t we may mimic Gettier's informal reasoning. First, we formally derive (e) (i.e., C(ιxJ(x))) from (d) (i.e., Jones = ιxJ(x) ∧ C(Jones)) and then use the fact that (d) is justified (i.e., u:[Jones = ιxJ(x) ∧ C(Jones)]). We will now show that this argument can be formalized in qfJ. Note that in qfJ, we may reason as follows: 
Eliminating Definite Descriptions, Russell-style
We can eliminate definite descriptions from Case I using, e.g., Russell's translation (cf. [27; 52; 59; 61]) of definite descriptions. According to Russell, C(ιxJ(x)) contains a hidden uniqueness assumption and reads as
and Jones = ιxJ(x) as J(Jones) ∧ ∀y(J(y) → y = Jones).
In addition, in the universe of Case I consisting of two objects Jones, Smith, a universally quantified sentence ∀yF (y) reads as F (Jones) ∧ F (Smith), and an existentially quantified statement ∃xG(x) reads as
Taking into account all of these simplifying observations, we may assume that for Smith (and the reader), ∀y(J(y) → y = Jones) reads as 
The assumption that (d) is justified for Smith can now be represented by
for some justification variable v. Smith's justified belief 'the man who will get the job has coins,'
according to Russell, should read as
The same considerations as above show that
is equivalent to ¬J(Smith), 
Finally, the formalization of (31) in our language amounts to stating that for some justification term p, Proof. After all the preliminary work and assumptions, there is not much left to do. We just note that (29) is a disjunct of (33) . A derivation of (34) from (30) in qfJ reduces now to repeating steps of Example 2, which shows how to derive a justified disjunction from its justified disjunct. 2
Comment 1
One can see clearly the essence of Gettier's example. In (33), one of two disjuncts is justified but false, whereas the other disjunct is unjustified but true. The resulting disjunction (33) is both justified and true, but not really known to Smith.
Hidden Uniqueness Assumption is Necessary
In this subsection, we study what happens if we deviate from Russell's reading of definite descriptions, in particular if we skip the uniqueness of the defined object. For example, let us read Gettier's proposition (d) as
Jones will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket,
and proposition (e) as
A man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.
Then a fair formalization of (35) would be
and the assumption that (35) is justified for Smith is formalized as
In this case, the set of explicitly made non-logical assumptions is 1. 
for some justification term t. We show that the assumptions 1-4 above do not suffice for proving (40) .
Proposition 3 For any justification term t, formula (40) is not derivable in qfJ from assumptions 1-4.
Proof. Suppose (40) is derivable in qfJ from assumptions 1-4. Then, by the Deduction Theorem, qfJ would derive 'Conjunction of 1-4 ' → (40).
It now suffices to build a Fitting qfJ-model ( Figure 3) where (41) does not hold at a certain world.
At 0, all assumptions 1-4 hold, but (40) is false at 0 for all t's. Indeed, (39) is false at 1, since its conjunct J(Smith) → C(Smith)
is false at 1, and 1 is accessible from 0. In this subsection, we show that references to coins and pockets, as well as definite descriptions, are redundant for making the point in Gettier example Case I. Here is a simpler, streamlined case based on the same material.
Smith has strong evidence for the proposition: (d) Jones will get the job. Proposition (d) entails:
(e) Either Jones or Smith will get the job. Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is true. But imagine further that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. Then 1) (e) is true, 2) Smith believes that (e) is true, and 3) Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true. But it is equally clear that Smith does not know that (e) is true. . ..
In this version, the main assumption is
Smith has a strong evidence that Jones gets the job.
Its straightforward formalization is v:J(Jones).
The claim is that
Smith is justified in believing that either Jones or Smith will get the job.
The natural formalization of the claim 
The set of formal assumptions is v:J(Jones), J(Smith), ¬J(Jones).
• maximal E 0 J(Smith)
• J(Jones) maximal The desired Gettier-style point is made on the same material but without the unnecessary use of quantifiers, definite descriptions, coins, and pockets. It is fair to note, however, that Gettier example Case II in [29] does not have these kinds of redundancies and is logically similar to the streamlined version of Case I presented above. (24); Jones = ιxJ(x), by the Factivity Axiom and some propositional logic; (Jones = ιxJ(x)) → J(Jones), an assumed natural property of definite descriptions; J(Jones), by Modus Ponens. This contradicts the condition ¬J(Jones) from (25) .
Gettier Example and Factivity
The question is, what we have learned about Justification, Belief, Knowledge, and other epistemic matters?
Within the domain of formal epistemology, we now have a basic logic machinery to study justifications and their connections with Belief and Knowledge. Formalizing Gettier is a case study that demonstrates the method.
We show that Gettier reasoning was formally correct, with some hidden assumptions related to definite descriptions. Gettier examples belong to the area of Justification Logic dealing with partial justifications and are inconsistent within Justification Logic systems of factive justifications and knowledge. All this, perhaps, does not come as a surprise to epistemologists. However, these observations show that models provided by Justification Logic behave in a reasonable manner.
For epistemology, these developments are furthering the study of justification, e.g., the search for the 'fourth condition' of the JTB definition of knowledge. Justification Logic provides systematic examples of epistemological principles such as Application, Monotonicity, Logical Awareness, and their combinations, which look plausible, at least, within the propositional domain. Further discussion on these and other Justification Logic principles could be an interesting contribution to this area.
Conclusions
Justification Logic extends the logic of knowledge by the formal theory of justification. Justification Logic has roots in mainstream epistemology, mathematical logic, computer science, and artificial intelligence. It is capable of formalizing a significant portion of reasoning about justifications. In particular, we have seen how to formalize Kripke, Russell, and Gettier examples in Justification Logic. This formalization has been used for the resolution of paradoxes, verification, hidden assumption analysis, and eliminating redundancies.
Among other known applications of Justification Logic, so far there are
• intended provability semantics for Gödel's provability logic S4 with the Completeness Theorem ([2; 4]);
• formalization of Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics for intuitionistic propositional logic with the Completeness Theorem ([2; 4]);
• a general definition of the Logical Omniscience property, rigorous theorems that evidence assertions in Justification Logic are not logically omniscient ( [10] ). This provides a general framework for treating the problem of logical omniscience;
• an evidence-based approach to Common Knowledge (so-called Justified Common Knowledge) which provides a rigorous semantics to McCarthy's 'any fool knows' systems ( [1; 5; 47] ). Justified Common Knowledge offers formal systems which are less restrictive than the usual epistemic logics with Common Knowledge [5] .
• analysis of Knower and Knowability paradoxes ([17; 18] ).
It remains to be seen to what extent Justification Logic can be useful for analysis of empirical, perceptual, and a priori types of knowledge. From the perspective of Justification Logic, such knowledge may be considered as justified by constants (i.e., atomic justifications). Apparently, further discussion is needed here.
